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104 Diskussion
und Wirklichkeit, zwischen Betrachtung und Beobachtung" wieder herzu¬
stellen. Ob es sich deshalb eher empfiehlt, Merton zu folgen, der von seiner
Auffassung gesagt hat, daß es sich „weniger um allgemeine Theorie handelt,
als um Theorien, also generalisierende Schlußfolgerungen aus Beobach¬
tungen", diese Frage ließ Professor Beerling offen. Er schloß mit einem
Hinweis auf die Feststellung von R. Dahrendorf, daß seit 1945 kein deut¬
scher Beitrag zu den fundamentalen Problemen der Soziologie erschienen
sei.
Hier wurde die Diskussion zunächst unterbrochen und es folgte der
Vortrag von Professor Ginsberg.
MORRIS GINSBERG
Towards a theory of social development
I should like to begin by expressing my deep appreciation of the honour
you have done me by inviting me to take part in your deliberations. In
thinking about a theme on which to address you it seemed best not to dwell
so much on the past achievements of German sociology as on the present
Situation and future needs. I should like in this context to put forward a
plea for a revival of interest in the idea of the evolution or development of
man and in the part played by rational factors in development.
I am well aware that the present climate of opinion is favourable neither
to the rationalist nor to the evolutionary outlook. To many it would seem
that both belong to an age now past and done with. But I can see no good
reason for accepting this verdict. On the contrary, now is the time when it
is of the greatest importance to reassert our belief in human reason, in the
fundamental unity of mankind, in the reality of progress and the possibility
of further progress.
The idea of development here envisaged must be distinguished from that
pursued by the Idealist philosophies of history and their Marxist variants.
I am not advocating a return to metaphysical notions of an Absolute Mind
reaching self-consciousness in the historical process. Nor do I believe that
we can say in advance that the process is unitary, or shaped decisively by
any one factor or tendency towards a predestined end. The empirical evi-
dence suggests that in the course of history man is slowly rationalised and
moralised. But the manner and the pace in which reason comes to pervade
the various spheres of human activity varies greatly from case to case. The
development of the social structure, the development of science, the de¬
velopment of religion and morals each follow their own course in partial
independence from the rest, and their relations to each other are variable
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aöd complex. The various developments differ in their rate of change, in
the readiness with which advances can be transmitted from one centre to
others and in their liability to retrogression. Nevertheless, in the long run
they are broadly correlated. The problem of sociology in its evolutionary
aspect is to define the nature of this correlation and to discover its con-
ditions.
In the case of knowledge and its applications the reality of development
and of progress in development is not in doubt. Knowledge is a System
which grows not by sheer cumulation or accretion, but by a process of
correlated change. Changes in one part or sphere induce or necessitate
changes in others. The absorption of new data suggests revision or recon-
struction of old concepts and the reconstruction in turn may suggest further
inquiry. But correlated change in a System that maintains its identity
through modification is precisely what is meant by development. Further-
more, in this case we have a Standard of value in the light of which progress
can be estimated. Advance in knowledge is judged, I take it, not by
reference to final or absolute truth, nor even by agreement with first princi-
ples taken as beyond doubt, but by the degree of consistency and mutual
support attained by the explanations offered and by the ränge or inclusiv-
eness of the experience covered. Finality is not expected, but we look for
increasing coherence, a widening of experience, a better balance between
the conceptual and experiential modes of inquiry, a growth in the capacity
for self-criticism and reconstruction - in short, increasing systematisation
of experience. What reason claims is not that it can attain final truth here
and now, but that it is the method of growth in understanding. The concept
of development is thus essential in interpreting the nature of human
thought. In other words, human thought is to be conceived as an organic
structure which maintains itself by the mutual support of its parts, growing
and modifying itself as it grows, but maintainig a recognisable identity
through modification.
I believe that the concept of development is essential also for the inter-
pretation of morality. In working out this idea, however, we must avoid the
mistake of the early theories of progress of identifying moral with intellec-
tual progress, or of assuming that „enlightenment", virtue and happiness
necessarily go together. In our age it is only too obvious that knowledge
can be used for evil purposes, especially when to the power over nature
is added the power over the minds of men. Any theory of moral progress
has to face the patent and glaring failure of men to learn from experience
and their inability to make use of such wisdom as there is in the ordering
of human affairs. Every such theory must take into consideration not only
the elements of advance but also of retrogression and, more particularly,
the terrifying recrudescence of cruelty and barbarism in our own time, and
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the nauseating mixture of moralism und power politics in the dealing of
nations with each other.
In dealing with this question we must not commit ourselves either to a
doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of man, or of ineradicable, original
sin. The facts call for no such heroic hypotheses. As far as the individual
is concerned, the difficulties that lie in the way of his rationalisation and
moralisation are piain enough. Modern psychology has brought out the
strength of unconscious and repressed instinctive drives and their impervi-
ousness to reason. It has shown how reason itself may be used to defeat
reason, and in what numerous ways cognition and emotion may be dissoci-
ated, producing a sort of indifference or apathy, robbing knowledge of its
power to influence action. As regards the part played by reason in social
development, it has to be remembered that moral advance does not depend
only on improvement in moral conceptions, but also on the extent to which
improvements in ideas are embodied in institutions and through them lead
to improvements in actual conduct. These changes clearly do not move in
harmony. Furthermore, it is important to lay stress on the fact that there
is no unitary mind guiding the action or the growth of societies. The sources
of action are in innumerable distinct centres. In view of this, the sur-
prising thing is not the failure but the degree of success attained, the
extent to which out of the blindness and mutual frustration common needs
to come to be recognised, leading slowly to the formation of a common
purpose or common purpose.
There is nothing in the facts to invalidate, and much to confirm, the
conclusion that in the course of historical development man is slowly
moralised, and that he does so in proportion as he becomes more rational.
By this, of course, is not meant that there is a genetic change in inborn
equipment. Men are not born more intelligent or more virtuous than in
former ages. What is asserted is that the collective achievements of mankind
as embodied in tradition and changing with it come to approximate more
closely to rational requirements. In the case of knowledge the criteria of
advance are not in dispute. I believe that very similar criteria are applicable
to morals. I have elsewhere suggested that there are five closely related but
distinguishable criteria by which moral Systems may be compared1). The
five criteria are:
1. The differentiation of morality from custom, law and religion, in-
volving the recognition of values and obligations as self-sustained and in-
dependent of external sanctions.
2. Universalisation, i. e. the extension of the ränge of persons to whom
common moral principles are applied and growing impartiality in their
application. This trend has involved not only a firmer grasp of principles
x) Cf. Reason and Experience in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1956).
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but a widening of the ränge of sympathy and the power of imaginative
identification.
3. Comprehensiveness and flexibility, i. e. openness to new values and
greater sensitivity and differentiation in response.
4. Systematic connectedness as judged by increasing coherence between
various moral judgements and articulation of underlying principles.
5. Capacity for self-criticism and self-direction, as judged, more particu-
larly, by the extent to which impartial investigation of the facts and critical
scrutiny of the ends pursued is allowed to shape public policy.
It is easy to see that adyance in one direction does not necessarily involve
advance in others. Thus a System may be internally coherent, but narrow
and exclusive, and thus fail to satisfy the criterion of universality. Again, a
System may be comprehensive in the sense of covering wide areas of life,
but if it relies on coercion or other external sanctions it fails to satisfy the
criterion of differentiation as defined above. Thus the general level of
development depends on the extent to which the various criteria tend to be
satisfied in harmony. In other words, the value of a moral System as a whole
depends on the coherence and objectivity of the concepts it employs, the
degree to which its underlying assumptions have been elicited and on the
part played by seif-critical thought in the various spheres of economic and
political life. It depends also on the way in which the line is drawn between
internal and external sanctions, that is, the spheres which are left to the
free choice of the individual and those which are held to call for social
control. The distinctions which in the course of history have come to be
drawn between the sphere of law and the sphere of morals, or between
spiritual and temporal powers, are from the point of view here adopted of
the greatest importance in estimating the general level of moral develop¬
ment.
On the more general question of social progress as distinguished from
progress in morality I can here point only very briefly to certain general
trends which seem to me to be important in this context. Firstly, there is
the gradual moralisation of religion. The distinction sometimes drawn be¬
tween nature-religions and ethical-religions is perhaps not warranted, as
there appear to be moral elements in all religions. But it seems clear that
both the conception of the divine and that of an after-life are gradually
transformed by moral insight, and that in the later phases there is even a
tendency to identify the spiritual with the ethical. The demand is then
made that religious beliefs must satisfy ethical tests.
Next, there is the trend to the unification and rationalisation of the legal
Systems of the world. That the rationalisation is not purely technical or
formal can be seen from the attempts increasingly made in later phases to
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base legislation on some conception of well-being, and to use law as an
instrument of social policy. The unification achieved is very impressive.
I do not know how many independent legal Systems there are, possibly ten
or so, and most of them are hybrids. The Systems derived from Roman law
and the common law of England between them have been accepted by
rather more lhan half of mankind. In the Asian and African world there is
now a growing demand for the modernisation of the law, and this must
make for further unification. There is here strong evidence of growth in
self-direction and the rational ordering life in mankind as a whole, over-
leaping political boundaries and differences in political Organisation.
Finally, there are certain economic developments which, despite the
obvious and deep-seated conflicts which still divide the peoples of the
world, point to a certain convergence of aims. There is a growing recog-
nition that the function of economic activity is, or ought to be, to supply
the material conditions of well-being for all, and that the scope of useful
intervention by society, whether in the form of State action, or action by
other collective agencies is, and under modern conditions must necessarily
be, much larger than was formerly supposed. The limits are largely practical
and technical, and they vary with the level of development. Thus what the
State can and ought to do in countries with a highly differentiated social
structure, an active public opinion capable of initiating movements for
peaceful change and offering resistance to monopolistic powers, must
obviously be very different from what the State can and ought to do in
dealing with a population inert politically, and not sufficiently diversified
to secure diffusion of power. The problem cannot be satisfactorily defined
in terms of the antithesis between individualism and collectivism, and it
changes in character at different levels of economic and political develop¬
ment. While at some stages the use of State powers is needed to liberate
the individual, at others the State tends to become tyrannical, unless held
in check by other organised bodies within it. The individual may then have
to be protected against these other bodies, for the division of powers may
mean a multiplication of tyrannies. The Western societies meet the
Problems thus arising in different ways. But they have in common, perhaps^
the general conviction that the important thing is to avoid giving too much
power either to the State or to any other organised groups within it. In
communist countries the problems involved take a different form owing
to the fusion and concentration of economic and political power. Whether
they will succed in overcoming the dangers of over-concentration and pass
to a phase in which both power and responsibility will be more widely
diffused, remains to be seen. I am not suggesting that there is agreement on
the various points involved. But I think there is a certain convergence in
diagnosis and this may make for greater agreement in the future. I think
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further that in the world as a whole there is a certain convergence of opinion
about the principles of distributive justice. Egalitarianism is gaining
ground in the sense that it is increasingly feit that differences in distribution
have to be justified either by showing that they are required, either in the
interests of efficiency, or as necessary conditions of well-being, and that in
any case they ought not to be of a magnitude likely to endanger the mini-
mum to which all are entitled. In varying degress the societies that have
moved in this direction are in the line of progress.
The principal conclusions which emerge from this discussion may be
summed up as follows:
Firstly, progress in human evolution consists in the growth of rationality,
that is, the systematic Organisation of experience.
Secondly, the concept of rationality applies to action as well as to thought.
The criteria of advance are substantially the same for both spheres.
Thirdly, the Organisation of action consists, partly, in the use made of
the knowledge of nature to serve human ends, partly in disclosing the
nature of those ends and the construction of ideal ends. Whether the
advance makes for social progress depends not only on the growth of knowl¬
edge and of moral insight, but on the extent to which such knowledge and
insight are embodied in social institutions and through them shape be-
haviour and mould character.
Fourthly, development is very uneven in different spheres of thought
and action. The changes that occur in the social and economic structure,
in the growth of scientific knowledge and in the ethico-religious outlook
are no doubt in the long run broadly correlated. But we know little of the
conditions affecting this growing correlation. Hence the difficulties of
prediction.
Finally, though no laws of social development have been discovered, some
long ränge trends in the history of humanity can be clearly discerned. These
show progress along certain lines and they establish the possibility, though
by no means the certainty, of further progress.
Die Verbindung aus dem Vortrag von Ginsberg zu der Thematik des
Symposions und der vorangegangenen Diskussion fand Professor Kraft
in Schelers These von der Machtlosigkeit des Geistes in der Geschichte, die
Becker zitiert hatte. Aus seinen amerikanischen Erfahrungen hob Pro¬
fessor Kraft hervor, in Deutschland sei die Wirksamkeit der Vernunft in
der Geschichte, das nämlich, was Hegel spirituell konstruiert hat, empirisch
nicht ausgenutzt worden. Er verwies dabei auf „The Life of Reason" von
Santayana, ein Werk, das bis heute nicht ins Deutsche übersetzt und in
